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POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE TIDELANDS DECISIONS
ON AIRSPACE SOVEREIGNTY
SIDE from the immediate importance of the points decided inAin the Tidelands cases,' the holdings have raised significant
questions in the far reaches of sovereignty. Other than special
consideration of Texas' claim that a distinguishing pre-admission
history had given her ownership of the contested submerged lands,
the crucial question decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States in all the Tidelands cases was that the States were not the
owners of the marginal belts along their respective coasts or the
underlying lands and that the Federal Government, rather than
the States, had paramount rights in and power over that belt,
which gave also full dominion over the resources of the soil under
that water area. While Federal control and power have been so
rapidly extended in recent years as to make a new assertion there-
of not startling, the holding that the thirteen original colonies
did not acquire ownership of the three-mile marginal ocean belt
along their coasts or the lands underlying that belt, and that the
first claim to the marginal sea was asserted by the National Gov-
ernment and that protection and control of it are a function of
national external sovereignty,' indicates the urgent need of re-
examining some presently assumed areas of sovereignty. In no
field is this more important than in aviation law- in the con-
templation of airspace sovereignty. The question arises whether
IU. S. v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947) ; U. S. v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 699 (1950) ;
U. S. v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707 (1950). "While these lands are often popularly known as
'tidelands,' literally the tidelands are those lands regularly covered and uncovered by
the ebb and flow of the tide, and the United States made no claim to them. The sub-
merged lands, the subject of litigation, lie seaward of the tidelands." Moore, Expropria-
tion of the Texas "Tidelands" by Judicial Fiat, 3 Baylor L. Rev. 130, n. 3 (1951).
2 U. S. v. California, supra note 1, at 31-34.
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the Federal Government or the States have sovereign rights in the
airspace above.
In international law there is no question as to sovereign rights
in the airspace. Every nation is recognized as having complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory and
territorial waters. Conversely, areas not part of the territory of
any nation, such as the high seas, are open to the use of all. The
United States adheres to this principle; it has been asserted by
both treaty and legislation.8 Control of aviation in the United
States, however, presents a problem not only on an international
scale - external sovereignty - but involves the question of power
as between the various States of the Union and the Federal Gov-
ernment - internal sovereignty. Recognition of the airspace of
the United States as part of the domain of the United States as
against all foreign nations does not necessarily resolve the ques-
tion as to whether the airspace above any one of the United States
is also a part of the domain of that State; the States may never.
theless have sovereign rights in this airspace for internal regula-
tory and police powers.
Sovereignty has been defined as the "supreme, absolute, and
uncontrollable power by which any independent state is gov-
erned.. . ." Such governmental powers are, under the United
States Constitution, distributed between the Federal and State
Governments. That document is usually construed as retaining
sovereign power of self-government in the States, or in the people,
except for specified grants of power, expressly or impliedly, dele.
3 The Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Paris, 1919 (U. S. Dept.
of State, Pub. No. 2143, 1944) included this basic doctrine. Although the United States
was signatory to this Convention, it did not later ratify it. But the United States has
adopted the same principle and has asserted its sovereignty over its airspace in the
passage of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 568, 49 U. S. C. 1946 ed. §§ 171.
184, and of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 977, 49 U. S. C. 1946 ed. §§ 401.
408, and by the signature and ratification of the Pan American Convention on Commer.
cial Aviation, Havana, 1928, 4 TRF.ATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTO-
COLS, AND AGRE EMENTS BETWEEN THE U. S. AND OTHER POWERS (U. S. Govt. Printing
Office, 1938) 4729 and of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Chicago, 1944
(U. S. Dept. of State Conf. Series 64, Article 1, Appendix II).
4 BLACK'S L. DicT. (4th ed. 1951) 1568.
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gated to the Federal Government.' There was thus established a
dual form of sovereignty with the States considered to be sovereign
or quasi-sovereign in character, retaining those powers not sur-
rendered to the Federal Government by the Constitution, and the
Federal Government sovereign in those rights which it holds under
the Constitution.' If the airspace is Federal domain, the Federal
Government has exclusive legislative powers therein, but if the
airspace is part of a State's domain, then the sovereignty of the
State and of the Federal Government would follow the ordinary
constitutional pattern regarding State and Federal powers. The
question of sovereignty of airspace, therefore, involves momentous
problems in the control of aviation - the economic regulation of
air commerce and jurisdiction of crimes committed and tortious
acts occurring in the air.'
Until comparatively recently it was generally assumed that the
airspace was part of the State below. There appeared to be a
practical division of airspace sovereignty between the States and
the Federal Government by regulation according to the boundaries
of the Constitution. Federal control was effected by reliance prin-
cipally upon the constitutional provision of power to regulate
commerce, although other constitutional powers, such as the
postal power, the treaty-making power, the war power, and the
maritime power have also been used. State control rested on the
States' reserved police powers. This idea is reflected in declara-
tions of legislation, in treaties, and in judicial decisions.
The Air Commerce Act of 19268 and the report of the Inter-
5 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U. S.
CONST. AMEND. X.
6 See THOMAS, ECONoMIc REULATION OF SCHEDULED Am TRANSPORT (1951) Ch. 2,
§ 2, pp. 24 ff., for a discussion of "Airspace Sovereignty and the Dual Nature of the
Government."
7 Cooper, Crimes Aboard American Aircraft: Under What Jurisdiction Are They
Punishable? 37 A. B. A. J. 257 (1951). This article analyzes the present undefined juris-
diction regarding crimes committed on board United States aircraft flying over foreign
territory, the high seas, the marginal seas, and the states of the Union.
8 Cited supra note 3.
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state and Foreign Commerce Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives9 relative thereto, contain interesting statements. Section
4 of the Act 0 authorized the President to provide for airspace
reservations by executive order, and, in addition, it authorized the
States to establish necessary airspace reservations if they were "not
in conflict either with the airspace reservations established by the
President under this section or with any civil or military airway
designated under provisions of... [the Act]." In reference to
this section, the House Committee observed:
... [T]he power of the President to establish Federal government
airspace reservations in the States in no wise diminishes the power of
the States to establish airspace reservations for such other purposes as
they deem advisable so long as such reservations are within the air-
space over which the States have acquired or retained sovereignty
under the Constitution and so long as the establishment of the reserva-
tions is an exercise of a Constitutional power reserved to the States and
does not interfere with the Federal airspace reservations or with the
Federal airways.",
Section 6 of the Act' 2 declared:
... [T]he United States has, to the exclusion of all foreign nations,
complete sovereignty of the airspace over the lands and waters of the
United States including the Canal Zone.
In its comments on this section, the House Committee said:
... The Section in no wise affects the apportionment of sovereignty
as between the several States and the United States, but only as between
the United States and the rest of the world. Insofar as the States had
sovereignty in the airspace at the time of the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, and such sovereignty was not by that instrument delegated to the
Federal government, and insofar as the States may have subsequently
acquired sovereignty in airspace in accordance with the Constitution,
such sovereignty remains unchanged.'3
" This report is contained in an article by Lee, The Air Domain of the United
States in CIVIL AERONAUTICS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AIR COMMERCE ACT OF 1926
CORRECTED TO AUGUST 1, 1928 (U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1943).
10 44 STAT. 570, 49 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 174.
11 Lee, supra note 9, at 36.
S1244 STAT. 572, 49 U. S. C. 1946 ed. § 176.
13 Lee, supra note 9, at 38.
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The comments by the House Committee are indefinite as to
what, if any, airspace sovereignty was held by the States at the
time the Constitution was adopted or as to whether the States had
actually acquired such sovereignty since that time. Too, the valid-
ity of the Air Commerce Act was not based solely on the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution. Apparently, however, Congress
did not intend to take from the States any airspace sovereignty
which they might then have.' Impliedly, sovereignty was acquired
by a State before it was admitted into the Union and was retained
afterward, or sovereignty was acquired subsequent to statehood.
Neither of these suppositions would seem to be suitable, how-
ever, because in the former, assertion of control over the airspace,
other than surface airspace, was not made until long after the
last State was admitted into the Union, and in the latter, power
to extend domain or territory vests solely in the Federal Govern-
ment by the Constitution.15
State statutes and court decisions likewise have supported the
proposition that the Federal Government does not have complete
sovereignty over the navigable airspace of the United States to
the exclusion of State authority. In Smith v. New England Air-
craft Company, Inc.," the court concluded that in the interests of
safety of the State it must possess jurisdiction to control airspace
above its territory. The court there said:
Every government completely sovereign in character must possess
power to prevent from entering its confines those whom it determines
to be undesirable. That power extends to the exclusion from the air of
all hostile persons or demonstrations, and to the regulation of passage
through the air of all persons in the interests of the public welfare and
the safety of those on the face of the earth. This jurisdiction was vested
in this Commonwealth [Massachusetts] when it became a sovereign
state on its separation from Great Britain. So far as concerns inter-
state commerce, postal service, and some other matters, jurisdiction
14 Cooper, State Sovereignty vs. Federal Sovereignty of Navigable Airspace, 15 J.
Air L. 27, 34 (1948).
15 THOMAS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 27.
16 270 Mass. 511. 170 N. E. 385 (1930).
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of passage through the air in large part was surrendered to the United
States by the adoption of the Federal Constitution."
Erickson v. King, State Auditor, et al., i" is in accord with the
position of the Massachusetts court, which it cites. In this case,
the court said:
Subject to the jurisdiction conferred upon congress by the federal
constitution relative to post roads, interstate commerce, and national
defense, the state has complete sovereignty of the air above its terri-
tory and may assert its police power therein."'
Parker v. James E. Granger, Inc.,2" later approved by the
Supreme Court of California, 21 with certiorari denied by the
United States Supreme Court,22 contained this holding:
The flight of the planes mentioned herein was intra-state, and under
the Federal Constitution and the California Aircraft Act enacted in
1929 (St. 1929, page 1874), the state of California was vested with
exclusive power to prescribe air traffic rules to govern the operation
of aircraft in flying in purely intra-state flights.2 3
Statutory claim to state sovereignty over the navigable airspace
has also been asserted. Fifteen 4 States have in effect the so-called
Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, which adopts the principle
that sovereignty over the airspace is vested in the State. Section
2 of that law provides:
Sovereignty in the space above the lands and waters of this State is
declared to vest in the State, except where granted to and assumed by
the United States, pursuant to a constitutional grant from the people
of this State.
These state decisions seem to indicate proper jurisdiction of the
17 Id. at 521, 170 N. E. at 389.
is218 Minn. 98, 15 N. W. 2d 201 (1944).
19 From the syllabus by the court.
20 39 P. 2d 833 (Cal. App. 1934).
214 Cal. 2d 668, 52 P. 2d 226 (1935).
22298 U. S. 644 (1936).
23 39 P. 2d at 835.
24 Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,




State Governments over certain phases of air navigation and a
legal duty on the State Governments to protect the local interests
of their inhabitants. But state laws passed for the protection of
their citizens will, of course, not be valid in so much of the
navigable airspace as may be found not to be within the territory
of the several States.25 State declarations of their sovereignty in
the airspace can be based on one of two theories:
... either, first, that the several original American colonies became
vested with sovereignty over and title to the airspace as part of their
original territory and had such territory at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution of the United States even though the art of flight
did not then exist; or, second, that the States have acquired the air-
space as additional territory since the adoption of the Constitution
and the development of the art of flight.2 6
Capable writers have argued that it was not until the art of ffight
was developed, long after the United States had been established
as a nation, that navigable airspace could be considered State
or National territory, as prior to that time such navigable airspace
was completely unusable by man. They have concluded, therefore,
that the navigable airspace is exclusive Federal territory.27 Fred-
eric P. Lee has put forth the argument that, as there was no sub-
stantial and continual use of the airspace until the present century,
either by air navigation or radio communication, no nation by
occupation or need of protection acquired any domain in the upper
airspace prior thereto.28 It was his view, accordingly, that the
United States did not acquire sovereignty in the upper airspace
until long after the Federal Constitution was adopted. Since the
original colonies had no domain in the upper airspace and it was
not part of their territory when the Constitution was adopted, and
since after the adoption of the Constitution no State could acquire
25 Cooper, State Sovereignty vs. Federal Sovereignty of Navigable Airspace, 15 J.
Air L. 27, 32 (1948).
26 Ibid.
27 Cooper, Crimes Aboard American Aircraft: Under What Jurisdiction Are They
Punishable? 37 A. B. A. J. 257, 327 (1951).




territory, as it would amount to the acquisition of new or addi-
tional domain, a right belonging only to the Federal Government,
airspace domain, therefore, was exclusive Federal territory and
came under the exclusive sovereignty of the Federal Government
as any other new territory thus acquired. Similarly, Clement L.
Bouv6 insisted that in international law "new territory has, as the
result of the capacity of mankind to fly, been added to that hither-
to subject to state [national] sovereignty."29 In the same tenor,
later, he asserted that "national sovereignty over navigable air-
space could not exist in fact until the discovery of the art of human
flight over a century following the adoption of the Constitution,
during which time capacity to control- a sine qua non of na-
tional sovereignty - was lacking."8 Both Lee and Bouv6 were
of the opinion that national sovereignty in the navigable airspace
embraces both external and internal sovereignty.
8
'
In United States v. Causby32 the owner of a dwelling and chick-
en farm near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina,
claimed that the United States had taken an easement over his
property by continued low flights of military aircraft entering and
leaving the airport."3 Substantially, the Court held "that the mili.
29 The Development of International Rules of Conduct in Air Navigation, 1 Air L.
Rev. 1, 6 (1930).
30 State Sovereignty or International Sovereignty over Navigable Airspace, 3 J. Bar
Assn. D. C. 5, 11 (1936).
"1 Cooper, State Sovereignty vs. Federal Sovereignty of Navigable Airspace, 15 J. Air
L. 27, 30 (1948).
32328 U. S. 256 (1946).
as N. C. GEN. STAT. (Michie, 1943) § 63-11 provided that sovereignty in airspace
was in the State except where granted to and assumed by the United States. It further
provided that flight in aircraft over the state was lawful unless at such a low altitude
as to interfere with the then existing use to which the land was put by the owner. The
ownership of the space above the lands and waters of the state was declared to be vested
in the several owners of the surface beneath subject to the right of flight. Federal
statutes as contained in 49 U. S. C. 1946 ed. Ch. 9, taken in part from the Air Com-
merce Act of 1926 and in part from the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, include provi-
sions that navigable airspace means airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight
prescribed by regulations issued under this Chapter. Also, the Acts recognize and declare
to exist in behalf of any citizen of the United States a public right of freedom of transit
in air commerce through the navigable airspace of the United States. The Civil Aero-
nautics Board has the power and duty to promote safety of flight in air commerce by
prescribing and revising air traffic rules.
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tary flights, complained of were below the minimum altitudes pre-
scribed by the [Civil Aeronautics] Board, that such flights were
not within the navigable air space, and that there had been a tak-
ing of claimant's property." Apparently, the Court divided the
airspace into two zones: a lower zone, below minimum altitudes
of flight fixed by Federal statutes, in which the landowner has
property rights incident to normal enjoyment of the surface, and
an upper zone, the navigable airspace, which Congress has placed
within the "public domain" as a public highway for transit free of
trespass claims. The Court rejected the ancient common law doc-
trine, Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum,85 saying that it
had "no place in the modern world," and affirmed that navigable
airspace is within the public domain.
The treatment by the Court of the airspace over the United
States implies that the navigable airspace is Federal territory
which Congress can dispose of and regulate.8" The Court said:
"The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared."" And
again: "... the flights in question were not within the navigable
airspace which Congress placed within the public domain.""8 The
Court did not "indicate how or in what manner the state of North
Carolina had granted its claimed sovereignty over the navigable
airspace to the United States in such manner that Congress could
place such navigable airspace in the public domain,"8 9 nor did the
opinion "disclose what rights, if any, the State retained in the
navigable airspace in which the right of private property contem-
34 Cooper, Crimes Aboard American Aircraft: Under What Jurisdiction Are They
Punishable? 37 A. B. A. J. 257, 260 (1951).
35 "Whose is the soil, his it is up to the sky. Co. Litt. 4a. He who owns the soil, or
surface of the ground, owns, or has an exclusive right to, everthing which is upon or
above it to an indefinite height. 9 Coke 54; Shep. Touch. 90; 2 BI. Comm. 18; 3 BI.
Comm. 217; Broom. Max. 395." BLACK'S L. DICT. (4th ed. 1951) 453.
"6 Cooper, Crimes Aboard American Aricraft: Under What Jurisdiction Are They
Punishable? 37 A. B. A. J. 257, 260 (1951).
"7 328 U. S. at 261.
'8 Id. at 264.
9 Cooper, Crimes Aboard American Aircraft: Under What Jurisdiction Are They
Punishable? 37 A. B. A. J. 257, 260 (1951).
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plated by the state statute was held in substance to be contrary
to the action of Congress in declaring the upper strata or navigable
airspace to be a public highway and part of the public domain."40
It would appear from the opinion in the Causby case that the
Court considered the navigable airspace to be Federal territory
and that no state sovereignty exists therein.4'
The Causby case holding is made even more pertinent when
it is considered in connection with the Tidelands cases, which held
that the theory on which the territorial waters or marginal sea
became part of national territory did not arise until after the
United States became a nation. One writer has concluded that the
cases create this inference:
... Either the several states may be held under these rulings to be
entirely without sovereignty or right of control in the navigable air-
space over their surface territories, or the power and rights of the
Federal Government may be found so paramount in the navigable air-
space as to procure the same legal results.42
The Tidelands cases clearly show that the Court felt that the
acquisition of rights of ownership in the submerged lands had
been effected subsequent to the adoption of the United States
Constitution.
At the time this country won its independence from England there
was no settled international custom or understanding among nations
that each nation owned a three-mile water belt along its borders....
It did happen that shortly after we became a nation our statesmen
became interested in establishing national dominion over a definite
marginal zone to protect our neutrality. Largely as a result of their
efforts, the idea of a definite three-mile belt in which an adjacent
40 Cooper, State Sovereignty vs. Federal Sovereignty of Navigable Airspace, 15 J.
Air L. 27, 36 (1948).
41 "The only logical conclusion which can be drawn from the entire opinion of the
Court in the Causby case is that the Court believed the navigable airspace to be federal
territory and not part of the territory of the States below." Cooper, Crimes Aboard
American Aircraft: Under What Jurisdiction Are They Punishable? 37 A. B. A. J. 257,
326 (1951).
42 Cooper, State Sovereignty vs. Federal Sovereignty of Navigable Airspace, 15 J.
Air L. 27, 28 (1948).
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nation can, if it chooses, exercise broad, if not complete dominion,
has apparently at last been generally accepted throughout the
world .... 's
The theory was thoroughly and deliberately developed."' Like-
wise, the doctrine of "paramount rights" as a basis for national
sovereignty was just as thoughtfully considered.45 The opinion in
United States v. California continues with the statement that
"[n] ot only has acquisition, as it were, of the three-mile belt been
accomplished by the National Government, but protection and
control of it has been and is a function of national external sov-
48 U. S. v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 32, 33 (1947).
44 .... [TIhe Court went out of its way to hold that the theory on which the tideland
waters or marginal seas became part of national territory did not come into being
until after the United States became a nation." Cooper, Crimes Aboard American Air-
craft: Under What Jurisdiction Are They Punishable? 37 A. B. A. J. 257, 326, 327
(1951).
45The Court stated the proposition repeatedly in emphatic language. To cite a few
examples:
"The ocean, even its three-mile belt, is thus of vital consequence to the nation
in its desire to engage in commerce and to live in peace with the world; it also
becomes of crucial importance should it ever again become impossible to preserve
that peace. And as peace and world commerce are the paramount responsibilities
of the nation, rather than an individual state, so, if wars come, they must be
fought by the nation...." U. S. v. California, 332 U. S. at 35.
"... Conceding that the state has been authorized to exercise local police
power functions in the part of the marginal belt within its declared boundaries,
these do not detract from the Federal Government's paramount rights in and
power over this area.. .. " Id. at 36.
"... [N]ational interests, responsibilities, and therefore national rights are
paramount in waters lying to the seaward in the three-mile belt.... " Ibid.
"... Now that the question is here, we decide for the reasons we have stated
that California is not the owner of the three-mile marginal belt along its coast,
and that the Federal Government rather than the state has paramount rights in
and power over that belt.. . ." Id. at 38.
"...Protection and control of the area are indeed functions of national exter-
nal sovereignty.... The marginal sea is a national, not a state concern. National
interests, national responsibilities, national concerns are involved. The problems
of commerce, national defense, relations with other powers, war and peace focus
there. National rights must therefore be paramount in that area." U. S. v. Louisi-
ana, 339 U. S. 699, 704 (1950).
"... If the property, whatever it may be, lies seaward of low-water mark, its
use, disposition, management, and control involve national interests and national
responsibilities. That is the source of national rights in it .... Unless any claim
or title which the Republic of Texas had to the marginal sea is subordinated to
this full paramount power of the United States on admission, there is or may be
in practical effect a subtraction in favor of Texas from the national sovereignty
of the United States.... " U. S. v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707, 719 (1950).
[Vol. 7
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ereignty.""' The two findings combined, that acquisition was ef-
fected after adoption of the United States Constitution and that
national interests require national sovereignty, suggest the theories
of Lee and Bouv6.47
The "paramount rights" idea might be susceptible of different
interpretations. Was it only explanation and reinforcement of the
argument that national sovereignty was required and had existed
from the beginning - that the States never could have owned -
or was it an assertion of the doctrine of inherent national power
to justify taking? Proponents of a strong national government
have from time to time advanced the principle that the Federal
Government possesses such powers as are necessary to contend
with any truly national problem in addition to express and implied
powers. The Supreme Court has held in many decisions that in
dealing with foreign nations the United States is sovereign and
must possess the necessary concomitant powers therefor without
limitation by specific delegation under the Constitution."8 Under
46 332 U. S. at 34.
47 "No one reading this opinion [U. S. v. California] can fail to note the striking
similarity between the line of reasoning adopted by the Court and the position taken
by both Lee and Bouv6 in asserting that sovereignty in the navigable airspace never
was vested in the original colonies nor in the States, but that it was acquired long after
the adoption of the Constitution by the Federal Government as exclusive Federal terri-
tory needed for national purposes ..." Cooper, State Sovereignty vs. Federal Sovereignty
of Navigable Airspace, 15 J. Air L. 27, 37 (1948).
4s E. g., ".... The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers
except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as
are necessary to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in
respect of our internal affairs. In that field, the primary purpose of the Constitution
was to carve from the general mass of legislative powers then possessed by the states
such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in the federal government, leaving those
not included in the enumeration still in the states.... That this doctrine applies only
to powers which the states had is self-evident. And since the states severally never
possessed international powers, such powers could not have been carved from the mass
of state powers but obviously were transmitted to the United States from some other
source....
"It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external
sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.... The power
to acquire territory by discovery and occupation ... the power to expel undesirable
aliens.., the power to make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties
in the constitutional sense ... none of which is expressly affirmed by the Constitution,
nevertheless exist as inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality ..
U. S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 315, 316, 318 (1936).
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such inherent power the Federal Government easily could assert
sovereignty as it might deem conditions compelled. However, in
view of the specific holding in the Tidelands cases that the colonies
had never owned the contested lands, such an inference would
appear to be unreasonable apprehension. Nevertheless, in view
of the claims in the Causby opinion of complete and exclusive
national sovereignty in the navigable airspace, the assertion of
paramount rights in the Tidelands cases, and the possibility of the
airspace being considered territory created by and since the art
of flight, it would seem not radical to say that the trend reason-
ably appears to be toward the affirmation of exclusive national
airspace sovereignty.
Armine C. Ernst.
